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Perhaps the most famous analogy in the history of philosophical
argument is that which Plato draws in the Republic between the constitution of
the city and the constitution of the soul. The analogy is justly famous, for it sheds
light on many aspects of mentality and personhood. In particular, as I shall try to
show here, the analogy — or at least something close to the analogy — sheds
light on the nature of akrasia or lack of self-control.
How to characterise akrasia? Without going into an analysis of our
ordinary conceptions of the phenomena associated with this term, I shall assume
that an agent is akratic when the following conditions are fulfilled. The agent
holds by intentional states in the light of which a certain response presents itself
as required; the states involved may be beliefs or desires, judgments or
intentions, or whatever. The agent functions under conditions that are intuitively
favourable, and within limits that are intuitively feasible, for acting as required;
there is nothing abnormal about how things transpire within their constitution or
circumstances — no malfunction, for example, or perturbation. But nevertheless
the agent fails to act in the required manner.
This is a broad conception of akrasia and may not coincide in extension
with received notions like that of weakness of will. Moreover, the conception
described is going to vary in extension with any variation of extension in the
related conception of normal conditions (Pettit 1999): for the record, I think that
conditions of functioning will be abnormal so far as a person is affected by blind
spots, idees fixes or fallacious habits of reasoning, or by affective pathologies or
ineradicable compulsions, or is subject to mesmerising external forces of
intimidation or temptation. But though the conception of akrasia is tied up in this
way with the theory of normal conditions, and is not necessarily designed to
track any received notions, still the phenomenon it purports to track  —
assuming that there is indeed a phenomenon that answers to the conception — is
bound to be of the greatest interest.
2I look here at what is necessary for a group to constitute an agent that can
display akrasia in this sense, and at what steps such a group might take to
establish self-control. I do so, not just because the topic has some interest in itself,
but — the Platonic message — because the discussion suggests some lessons
about how we should think of akrasia in the individual  as well as in the
collective case.  Under the image that the lessons support, akrasia is a sort of
constitutional disorder:  a failure to achieve a unity projected in the avowal of
agency. This image fits well with the constitutional model of the soul that
Christine Korsgaard (1999) finds in Plato’s analogy and her explication of the
analogy offers a precedent — and indeed a prompt — for the line taken here.
The paper is in three sections. In the first I look at three sorts of groups
that are incapable, so I argue, of akrasia; these I describe respectively as mere
collections of individuals, mere aggregations, and ordered aggregations. In the
second section I introduce a further sort of group, which I describe as an
integration of individuals, and I argue that this is capable of akratic behaviour.
And then in the final section I draw out some lessons of the discussion that bear
on individual as well as collective akrasia.
1. Groups incapable of akrasia
A group or collectivity will constitute an agent just so far as it is the bearer
of intentional properties: just so far as it forms attitudes like beliefs and desires,
or judgments and intentions, and acts on their basis. There are a number of
different accounts, each progressively richer than the preceding, of what is
required for a group to be an agent in this sense. I shall argue that only a group
which satisfies the richest account is capable of akrasia.
Collections of individuals
The least demanding account of what is required for a group to be an
agent only ascribes agency in a very strained sense and need not detain us long.
It is the sort of account suggested by Anthony Quinton (1975, 17) when he says:
To ascribe mental predicates to a group is always an indirect way of ascribing
such predicates to its members. With such mental states as beliefs and
attitudes, the ascriptions are of what I have called a summative kind. To say
3that the industrial working class is determined to resist anti-trade union laws
is to say that all or most industrial workers are so minded.
According to this account, any number of individuals, no matter how
arbitrarily related to one another, will be a bearer of intentional properties and
will constitute an agent — albeit something less than an agent proper — just so
far as the individuals in the group are the bearers of such properties. There is
nothing to a group’s being minded — being the bearer of mental properties —
and to its revealing that mind in action than is already assured by the fact that it
is a collection or set of individually minded agents.
This account is so generous that it amounts, as indeed Quinton intends, to
an eliminativism about group agents. In the easy, summative sense in which a
collection may hold a certain attitude — say, the belief that p —  any subset is
just as likely to hold an attitude, even a conflicting attitude, and so is any larger
set of which the collection is a subset. The account makes it so easy for
collectivities to hold attitudes that it represents them as agents only in a make-
believe sense: ‘only by figment, and for the sake of brevity of discussion’ (Austin
1869, 364). No such fictive agents could display anything remotely like akrasia.
Far from holding by attitudes which they might fail to live up to in action, they
hold by no attitudes whatsoever (Pettit 2000).
Aggregations of individuals
The debunking account of group agency that Quinton represents has been
roundly rejected in the recent literature and has served as a stimulus to the
development of a family of much more demanding analyses. These analyses
agree that a group cannot have intentional attitudes in a serious, literal sense, just
in virtue of most of its members having corresonding individual attitudes. The
members must do something, as we might put it, in order to bring group
attitudes into existence. They must form intentions about what is to transpire,
they must reveal those intentions to one another, and they must adopt measures
that give effect to relevant intentions: measures such as those involved in
accepting a certain formula as a matter of joint belief or endorsing a certain
authority as acting on behalf of the group. This style of analyis focusses on group
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with a disposition to action, but with the acceptance of a formula. It suggests —
and I shall go along with the idea — that those are going to be the principal kinds
of intentional state that collectives exemplify.
The approach generally followed in this literature is to take a grouping of
two or perhaps three agents and to try and identify the conditions under which
we would ascribe a collective intention or judgment or action to them (Gilbert
1989; Meijers 1994; Searle 1995; Tuomela 1995; Bratman 1999). The analyses all
draw in some way on work in game theory and related disciplines, in particular
on the idea that people in interaction will form beliefs about one another’s
dispositions, beliefs about one another’s beliefs about such dispositions, beliefs
about one another’s beliefs about such beliefs, and so on.
The analyses generally agree that in order for joint intention to appear, for
example, people must share in a mutual belief of this sort that bears on what
each believes about the dispositions and beliefs of others, and on how each is
ready to act in the event of others acting in a complementary way. Thus Michael
Bratman (1999) argues that you and I will have a shared intention to do
something just in case a) you intend that we do it and I intend that we do it; b)
we each intend that we do it because a) holds; and c) those clauses are matters of
which we are each aware, each aware that we are each aware, and so on in a
hierarchy of mutual belief. The hierarchy will mean that each believes the matter
in question — say, that p; each believes that each believes that p; each believes
that each believes that each believes that p; and so on. And so on, most plausibly,
in this mode: while not everyone may believe the required condition at each
higher level, at least no one will disbelieve it at any such level (Lewis 1969).1
 I am happy to assume that a common-belief analyis of some kind will
give us a plausible story as to what is involved in a group’s forming a judgment
or intention, or performing an action. Common beliefs about the group’s
judgments and intentions will materialise fairly spontaneusly among people in
face-to-face groups of two or three. And they will materialise in groups with
larger memberships on the basis of common beliefs as to the procedures to be
followed in identifying the judgments and intentions of the group. Those
5procedures will typically involve voting among members —  majoritarian voting
in most plausible instances — or voting among those whom members elect as
authorities. The votes required may be active or virtual. Someone will cast a
virtual vote in favour of an arrangement or initiative to the extent that they could
contest it — with whatever chance of success — but choose not to do so. To vote
for something in the active sense is to say ‘Yea’; to vote in the virtual is to be in a
position to say ‘Nay’ and to refrain from exercising that option.
We had no hesitation in saying that a group agent that is merely a
collection of individually minded agents cannot display anything approximating
akrasia. But what now of the group agent that aggregates its views from the
views of individual members, whether on the basis of some formal voting
mechanism or in a more spontaneous manner. What of the sort of group that we
can describe as an aggregation, as distinct form a mere collection, of individuals?
Such an aggregated group will be minded on an indirect basis that allows the
mind of the group — its pattern of judgments and intentions — to come apart
from the minds of its individual members. So does that mean that it will be
capable of akrasia? I argue not.
The group will aggregate its group attitudes from the attitudes of
individual members, forming on every issue an attitude that reflects the inputs of
those members. In the typical, large-scale case it will tend to do this by relying on
some explicit or implicit voting procedure. But the trouble with a group agent
that operates solely by such aggregative moves is that it may not have the sort of
unity or integrity that we require in an agent proper, and in particular in the sort
of agent that is capable of akrasia.
By a line of argument that has been widely endorsed in recent
philosophical thought, a system will count as an intentional subject only if it
preserves intentional attitudes over time and forms, unforms and acts on those
attitudes — at least within intuitively feasible limits and under intuitively
favourable conditions — in a rationally permissible manner: only if it displays a
certain rational unity (Dennett 1987; Pettit 1993. Ch.1). If the system believes that
p and comes across evidence that not p, it must tend to unform that belief. If the
system believes that p and learns that if p then q, it must come to form the belief
6that q or to unform one of the other beliefs. If the system desires that p, believes
that by X-ing it can bring it about that p, and believes that other things are equal,
then it must tend to X. Let the system fail in such ways — in particular, let it fail
in ways that cannot be explained by departures from favourable conditions or by
breaches of feasible limits — and we will have to conclude that the states we took
to constitute intentional attitudes do not actually constitute attitudes after all;
they do not function in the manner required.
Even if we introduce the sort of complexity postulated in aggregative
stories about collective agents, that will not guarantee that those subjects have
the rational unity associated with intentionality. Those stories are all consistent
with the collectivity’s acting by conventions that allow rational disunity. The
convention established in the mutual awareness of members may ordain, for
example, that the collectivity shall be deemed to judge or intend whatever a
majority of members vote for its judging or intending in a given case. And it is
demonstrable that if such a convention obtains — if the attitudes of the
collectivity are required to be continuous in that majoritarian way with the
current votes of members — then the collectivity may be guilty of grievous
irrationality. The convention will enable the group to form putative judgments
and intentions one by one, but it will allow the formation of judgments and
intentions that fail to cohere with one another as a whole. It will allow the group
to sustain such an irrational jumble of would-be judgments and intentions that
we cannot think of it as an intentional agent proper and we cannot think of the
states formed as judgments and intentions in any proper sense of those terms.
How to demonstrate the threat of such a failure of rational unity? I have
written elsewhere on the problem involved — the discursive dilemma, I call it —
and I shall summarise the line of argument briefly here (Pettit 2000; List and
Pettit 2001; Pettit 2001). The problem derives from an issue first raised in
jurisprudence (Kornhauser and Sager 1986; Kornhauser 1992; Kornhauser 1992;
Kornhauser and Sager 1993. See too Chapman 1998; Brennan 1999).  In essence, it
comes to this. If we take a set of rationally connected issues and then ask a group
of people to determine its view as a group on each of those issues, a majoritarian
pattern of voting may lead the group to endorse inconsistent positions. It may do
7this, in particular, without any members of the group being individually
inconsistent in their votes.
Suppose for example that a group of three people, A, B and C, has to
determine its views on each of three propositions, ‘p’, ‘if p then q’ and ‘q’, and
that the procedure they follow is to assent to a proposition in the event of a
majority supporting it, and to dissent otherwise. It is entirely possible that the
members of the group will cast their votes on the pattern involved in Matrix I, for
each individual expresses a consistent set of views in the votes that he or she
casts according to that matrix. But if they do cast their votes on that pattern, then
a majority will support ‘p’, a majority support ‘if p then q’ and yet a majority
reject ‘q’. And in that case the group as a whole will be committed to an
inconsistent set of judgments.
  p if p, then q   q
A. Yes         No No
B. No         Yes No
C. Yes         Yes Yes
Matrix I
The problem that the discursive dilemma makes vivid is that it is possible
for perfectly consistent and coherent individuals to give majority support to each
of a set of inconsistent or incoherent judgments. The members comprising the
different majorities may vary so that there is no individual who belongs to the
majority on each issue and who is guilty as an individual of irrationality. In the
scenario depicted in Matrix I, for example, there is a majority in favour of ‘p’, a
majority in favour of ‘if p, then q’ and a majority in favour of ‘not q’, but there is
no individual who votes for each of the judgments in that inconsistent set. A
votes against ‘if p, then q’; B against ‘p’; and C, in effect, against ‘not q’.
The lesson should be clear. In order for a collectivity to count as an
intentional agent in a literal sense — and therefore as an agent capable of akrasia
— not only must there be a basis in the interactive disposition of members for
ascribing judgments and intentions and actions to the collective; that is the point
on which the mutual-awareness literature rightly insists. There must also be a
basis for thinking of the collectivity as a subject that is rationally unified in such a
8way that, within feasible limits and under favourable conditions, we can expect it
to live up to the constraints of rationality; we can expect it to enter and exit
putative states of belief and desire, judgment and intention, in a way that makes
rational sense and we can expect it to perform in action as those states require.
But the existence of discursive dilemmas means that there is no reason to expect
a mere aggregation of individuals to display rational unity in the attitudes it
aggregatively constructs, even in intuitively the most normal of circumstances:
even, for example, when everyone in the group is rational, well-informed and
free to vote as the wish. Thus there is no reason to treat the mere aggregation of
individuals as an agent proper; there is no reason to think that it will have a
single, unified vision by which to orientate in the world.
This observation is enough on its own to ensure that the mere aggregation
is incapable of akrasia; there can be no akrasia without agency proper. But the
point in any case is palpable. Just as the group in Matrix I asserts that p and that
if p then q but denies that q, so a group might be led by aggregation — led even
in the most normal of circumstances — to endorse propositions that make a
certain action rational and yet to reject that action. Would we be inclined to
postulate akrasia in such a case? Of course not. If there were no reason to expect
the group to act according to the other propositions endorsed, then there would
be no need to resort to a hypothesis of akrasia in order to explain its failure to act
in that way.
The discussion so far supports two negative results: first, that a mere
collection of individual agents cannot display group akrasia and, second, that a
mere aggregation of such agents cannot do so either. But there is a third negative
result that we can also derive from consideration of these cases and I turn now to
this.
Ordered aggregations of individuals
Suppose that an aggregation of individuals operates by voting on separate
issues as they come up one by one. And now imagine that for some reason —
maybe as a result of how the members are designed at unconscious levels of
performance — the voting gives rise to irrational results only under conditions
9that we can independently discount as abnormal conditions of functioning. The
aggregation is rationally ordered, though only in a more or less mechanical
manner. Could we regard such an ordered aggregation as an intentional agent?
And, more particularly, could we regard it as an agent that is capable of akrasia?
The sort of group agent envisaged — and I do not say that it is a plausible
entity — would resemble the simple intentional system that most of us take non-
human animals like cats and dogs to be. Dogs appear to form attitudes of belief
and desire, to act on the basis of those attitudes, and to update them
appropriately so that under most conditions of functioning we think of them as
satisfying constraints of consistency and the like. Yet they do not do this through
ever becoming aware of irrationalities as such and adjusting so as to avoid them.
They are designed so that under normal conditions, as we intuitively think of
them, such irrationalities just happen not to emerge. The ordered aggregation
envisaged under our current hypothesis would display a similar, blind
disposition to avoid irrationality, at least under most circumstances, and it would
make a similar claim to be regarded as an intentional agent.
I am happy to think of dogs and cats as intentional agents. They act in a
manner that is well explained by the presence of intentional attitudes and they
are disposed, however blindly, to display rational unity (Pettit 1993; McGeer and
Pettit 2001). For the same reason, then, I am happy to think that the ordered
aggregation envisaged in our thought experiment might count as an intentional
agent too. But would it count as an agent capable of akrasia? As in the case of the
collection and the regular aggregation, I argue not.
Suppose that the ordered aggregation makes certain putative judgments,
or forms certain putative intentions, apparently recognising in light of those
states that a certain response is required of it. And imagine now, as we might
expect of an akratic agent, that it fails to display that response. Would we be
entitled in these circumstances to ascribe akrasia to it? By the account of akrasia
sketched at the beginning of this essay, we would be entitled to take the
aggregation as akratic if it were indeed an intentional agent and if conditions of
functioning were normal. But if the ordered aggregation failed to display rational
unity under normal conditions, then that would mean that we had no reason to
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take it to be an intentional agent. Or at least it would mean that we had no reason
to take it to be an intentional agent with judgments and intentions such that it
failed to live up to them. We might try to save the imputation of agency by
revising the judgments and intentions ascribed but we would never be in a
position to think both that it was a proper agent and that it manifested akrasia.
The condition necessary for postulating akrasia — that relative to the intentional
attitudes ascribed it falls short of rational unity under normal conditions — is a
condition that would be sufficient for denying intentional agency or for revising
the ascription of intentional attitudes so as to restore the semblance of unity.
The problem with the ordered aggregation is that it counts as an
intentional agent only so far as it reveals intentional attitudes in a rationally
unified pattern of operation. There are states it enters and exits such that the
ways they are formed and unformed — say, by on the basis of voting — and the
ways they operate in relation to one another, and ultimately in relation to
behaviour, reveal them to be intentional attitudes. Let the ordered aggregation
fail on the operational side, therefore — let it fail to display rational unity under
conditions that cannot be discounted as abnormal for functioning — and its title
to being an intentional agent must falter. There will be no room for entertaining
the hypothesis that it is an intentional agent but one that is suffering akrasia.
This third result should be no surprise, given that the ordered collectivity
is an analogue of the non-human animal that achieves rational unity in a blind or
mechanical way. For the argument just used will apply to non-human animals as
well. Anything that might be taken as evidence of akrasia in such an animal will
tend to undermine our confidence that it is an intentional system. Or it will lead
us to revise our account of that creature’s intentional attitudes, so that it no
longer looks akratic. It is no surprise, therefore, that by our ordinary lights dogs
and cats and the like do not display anything like akratic behaviour.
2. A group capable of akrasia
We have seen that collective akrasia is not going to be realisable in a mere
collection of individuals, in a mere aggregation of individuals or even in an
ordered aggregation of individuals. But these three negative results point us
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towards a positive claim and I try to describe and defend this claim in the
present section.
In order for a collection of agents to be capable of counting as an
intentional agent in its own right, and therefore as an agent capable of akrasia, it
is necessary for it to be able to form states that are fit for the role of intentional
attitudes: say, the role of judgments and intentions. Call this the aggregative
requirement of collective agency. But in order for those states actually to play the
role of intentional attitudes it is equally necessary that the collection be able to
unify them rationally with one another and with the behaviours that can be
ascribed to the group. And if the collection is to be the sort of agent that can
display akrasia, it is necessary that it be able to unify them rationally in
something more than the mechanical manner of the ordered aggregation. Call
this the integrative requirement of collective agency.
With the aggregative and integrative requirements in mind, we can
describe the profile of a group that transcends the collection and the aggregation
— the bare aggregation or the ordered aggregation — of individuals. This will
constitute what we might describe as an integration of individuals. It will be an
aggregated collection that takes steps to promote the achievement, as such, of
rational unity or integrity.
It is relatively easy to see how such a group might emerge. Let a collection
of people establish or grow into a common purpose or purposes, on the basis of
various levels of common belief. Let it face a variety of issues, some at the same
time, some at different times, that it needs to resolve in order to pursue its
purposes. Let it initially determine its view about each of those issues — taken
separately — on the basis of some majoritarian form of voting, active or virtual.
Let it baulk, however, in the event of the views thereby espoused — whether at
the same or at different times — proving not to cohere with one another, or not
to cohere with the actions that it is deemed to take: let it be sensitive as such to
the requirements of coherence, recognising that they are grounded in the
requirements of agency. And, finally, let it take steps in such an event that guard
against rational disunity; let it strive to endorse only views that can be integrated
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with one another into single rational vision of how things are and of how it is
desirable that they should be.2
The integration of individuals established on the basis of such a mode of
functioning would have an irresistible claim to being an intentional agent in its
own right. It would embrace a rationally unified vision of things and it would act
rationally on the basis of that vision. Moreover, it would show itself to be aware
of the constraints that must be satisfied by a rational agent and it would be
disposed to act so as to try to satisfy those constraints. It is hard to see what
further credentials could be required in order to establish agency. True, the
group envisaged will have no autonomous means of perception, no emotions in
its own right, and no spontaneous inferential or other dispositions; it will exist
and operate only by courtesy of individual contributions and only under
mechanical procedures of aggregation and correction. But the group envisaged
will have a robustly unified vision of the world and will generally act as that
vision requires. However bloodless and robotic it may be, there is no good
reason to deny that it has the standing of an agent. So at any rate I shall assume
here.
The elements required for the emergence of an integration of agents are all
readily available in day-to-day life. The richest requirement is that the members
of the group have to be aware as such of the constraints to be satisfied by a
rational agent, so that they can adjust appropriately if they find that the
constraints are breached. But this is not problematic. We have already assumed
that in aggregating their views into collective beliefs the members rely on getting
the group to accept relevant formulae. If people understand a formula, say ‘p’,
then they have to know, more or less fully, what sort of thing provides inductive
evidence in its favour and what provides evidence against; which propositions
are consistent with it and which inconsistent; which propositions entail it and
which are entailed by it; and so on. But if they know this, then they know the
constraints of rationality that a believer that p, or of course someone who intends
to make it the case that p, will have to satisfy; what those constraints rule out are
precisely responses that breach inductive coherence, deductive consistency and
the like.
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Integrations of the kind described are perfectly familiar entities. Think of
public bodies or business corporations or private associations or think of a few
collaborators in some enterprise. Every such collection of people is going to have
a more or less well-identified set of purposes to which its members have to
subscribe. And every such collection is going to form judgments and intentions
in the course of devising plans for the advancement of those purposes. The
judgments and intentions are likely to be formed on the basis of explicit voting
procedures, whether in the group as a whole or in one or another unit that it
comprises. But the votes taken under such procedures will never be allowed to
generate rational disunity. If they happen to propose an irrational set of
judgments or intentions then the group will take steps to revise or moderate the
votes taken. Any group that regularly failed to do this would find itself unable to
act systematically in pursuit of its goals; it would find itself trying to orientate by
an inconsistent map. And any group that failed to do this would be a laughing
stock among its members and among the populace at large.
But would the integrated group of the kind envisaged be an agent capable
of akrasia, or just an agent like the ordered aggregation that we would never
have compelling reason to treat as akratic? That is the crucial question for our
purposes. I now proceed to argue, in positive vein, that there is little or no
difficulty in thinking that an integration of individuals might prove to be an
akratic agent.
There are three observations I make in the course of marshalling the
argument. The first is that there is no problem of the kind that arose with
ordered aggregations in acknowledging that integrations may be akratic. The
second is that we can see why integrated collectivities might be subject, even in
conditions that count as perfectly normal, to akrasia; we can see a difficulty in
which akrasia might be sourced. And the third is that we can see strategies
whereby an integrated group might hope to get over that difficulty and to avoid
akrasia. This last observation is important because we would be loathe to
postulate lack of self-control in an agent that was incapable of making successful
efforts to achieve self-control.
First observation
14
 The problem that would stop us from ascribing akrasia to the ordered
collectivity is that the condition necessary for doing this — that the agent fails to
achieve rational unity under normal conditions of functioning — would deprive
us of reason to support the ascription of agency in the first place. This problem
will be overcome only where the failure to achieve rational unity does not
undermine the claim to agency in this way. The potentially akratic group must
be able to prove itself capable of agency despite displaying the rational disunity
associated with akrasia.
The integrated group characterised above will be able to meet this
constraint. We can readily imagine such a group failing to behave in the way that
the views it supports require, even under conditions that we have no
independent reason to regard as abnormal. And we can imagine this happening
in circumstances where we would have no reason to doubt its status as an
intentional agent. For the integrated group is capable, under our characterisation,
of recognising rational constraints as such. And so it is capable of recognising,
admitting and denouncing the failure involved, seeing it as a sort of failure that it
should avoid.
If the group does this, and if we accept its sincerity, then there is going to
be no problem in taking it to have intentional attitudes that it failed, despite
conditions of functioning being normal, to act on. The fact that the group
reaffirms the intentional states that it failed to live up to, acknowledging that
failure as a failure, will make for a big contrast with the situation that might arise
in the case of the ordered aggregation. It will give us a powerful reason to
countenance the group as an intentional agent, dismissing the counter-evidence
that its behaviour constitutes. And if we do continue to take it as an intentional
agent, without revising our ascription of intentional attitudes, then we will have
to ascribe akrasia to it.
The failure involved in akrasia means that the group does not satisfy the
requirement of rational unity in the ordinary way that we would expect of an
intentional agent. But it is worth noting that the acknowledgement of failure will
help to put right this shortfall from unity. When an integrated group admits such
failure, then it can be seen as disowning the akratic action, denying it the status
15
of a behaviour that reflects its intentional states: its presumpitively unified way
of seeing the world. It can be seen as laying claim to rational unity of a second-
best sort: a unity that can exist in spite of the disunity displayed in actual
behaviour.
Second observation
The second observation I want to make is that the sort of failure associated
with akrasia is perfectly intelligible in the case of the integrated group. There is a
compelling reason why we might expect a group of the sort envisaged to find it
difficult to get its act together and to manifest in action a unified understanding
of what there is and what there ought to be.  There is a compelling reason to
expect such difficulty — and the possibility of failure — even when the group is
functioning in intuitively normal conditions. This has to do with the fact that any
integrated group is going to be plagued by discursive dilemmas.
Consider a simple group that operates by taking a majority vote on every
issue that it confronts in the course of pursuing its purposes. The group may be
the editorial committee of a journal, the workforce in some joint enterprise, a
body that is commissioned to discharge a certain public duty, or whatever.
Suppose that the group operates under intuitively normal circumstances:
nothing stops members from debating fully and rationally the position that they
ought to adopt on each issue, none of them is prey to any sort of irrationality in
the votes that they cast, the voting procedures followed do not give rise to any
particular difficulty, and so on. It is entirely possible, nonetheless, that the group
will confront discursive dilemmas, as this was possible with aggregations of
people. And it is entirely possible that despite the fact of operating in normal
conditions, and despite the fact of having and trying to exercise the self-
regulative resources needed to promote collective rationality — these are the
resources unavailable to the aggregation — still, it will fail to act as its official
and continuing view requires it to act. It is entirely possible, in other words, that
it will display akrasia.
The point is best established with reference to an example. Take a non-
commercial academic journal with an editorial committee of three members that
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resolves all the issues it faces by majority vote and that is not subject to
intuitively abnormal conditions of functioning. Suppose that the committee votes
in January for promising subscribers that there will be no price rise within five
years. Suppose that it votes in mid-year that it will send papers to external
reviewers and be bound by their decision as to whether or not to publish any
individual piece. And suppose that in December it faces the issue as to whether it
should be prepared in principle to publish papers that involve technical
apparatus and are quite costly to produce. The earlier votes will argue against its
being prepared to do this, since a rise in the number of technical papers
submitted and endorsed by reviewers — endorsed, without any eye to overall
production costs — might force it to renege on one or other of those
commitments. But nonetheless, of course, a majority may support the acceptance
of technical papers, without any individual being irrational. The members of the
committee might vote as follow.
Price freeze External review Technical papers
A. Yes         No Yes
B. No         Yes Yes
C. Yes         Yes No
Matrix II
Discursive dilemmas of this kind present a group with a hard choice.
Members have to choose between, on the one side, letting the group be fully
responsive to individual views, as recorded in majority voting, and on the other,
ensuring that the group is collectively rational. Sometimes it will be hard for the
group to determine where the demand for collective rationality leads: whether
they should revise one of the earlier votes in Matrix II, for example, or the vote
they have just taken. But even if there is no difficulty of this kind — even if it is
clear what collective rationality requires of the group — they may find it hard to
live up to that requirement; they may find themselves prey to akrasia.
They will not find it hard to live up to the requirement, of course, if they
are individually devoted to the group and are in no way tempted to defect from
what the group requires of them. A group whose members were dedicated in
this way would operate like a perfectly virtuous agent, always spontaneously
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supporting what the balance of available reasons requires of the group. But not
all members need be so devoted to the group in which they figure; and when
something less that full collective devotion is on offer, then it may prove very
difficult for members to get their act together and ensure that the group lives up
to the considerations that it endorses.
Suppose in the example just given that the group looks again at its votes in
the first two columns and decides that they should stand, whether on their own
merits or because it is now too late to change them. In other words, suppose that
the members quickly resolve the question as to what collective rationality
requires of the group: it requires them to limit the number of technical papers to
be accepted. It is still possible in this event, and without conditions of
functioning ceasing to be normal, that the group will find it hard to act on that
determination: in effect, to act against the majority who support an open policy
on technical papers.
That majority might remain individually and stubbornly inclined to
support the acceptance of technical papers. And so we can imagine them turning
their eyes from the group as a whole, and sticking to their votes when the issue is
raised again. As we imagine this, we envisage the group taking an akratic line in
the policy it is forced to announce in December. Without doubts arising about its
status as an intentional agent — we might expect it to acknowledge and try to
rectify the failure, if it gives rise to difficulty — we can imagine it falling away
from the ideal of unified agency, due to its betrayal by members of the
recalcitrant majority.
What might motivate the recalcitrant majority in the sort of case
envisaged? They might be moved by a more or less selfish inclination or
identification, being technically minded themselves; or they might be moved by
a sense of fairness towards those who would be disadvantaged; or whatever.
Personal virtue is as likely as personal vice to source recalcitrance towards a
collectivity.  Virtue in the individual members of a group may make for akrasia
in the group as a whole.
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But could it really be rational for the recalcitrant members to stick to a
deviant pattern of voting? I don’t see why not. They would satisfy their private
motives, selfish or virtuous, by doing so. And they might individually expect to
get away with such voting, being outvoted by others; they might expect to be
able to free-ride. Or they might hope that even if a majority remains recalcitrant,
this will not cause problems: there will not be a deluge in the number of technical
papers submitted and accepted, and the committee can get away with holding by
all of the three commitments involved.
What will happen if the recalcitrant majority are wrong in these hopes,
and the group does not get away with such recalcitrance in its ranks? On pain of
no longer having a claim to be an agent proper — or at least an agent proper in
the relevant domain of activity — the group will have to take measures to bring
the recalcitrant majority into line. For it will have to admit the failure and, in
token of the admission, go to a reversal of policy. Unless it does this it cannot be
represented — and it cannot represent itself — as an agent that acts out of a
rationally unified view of the world. It can be seen only as an aggregate of
different agents, not as an agent unified within itself: only as many, not as one.
Third observation
The final observation I want to make in support of my claim that
integrated groups can display akrasia is that there are strategies available to any
such group whereby it might seek to guard against this sort of failure. One way
in which a group might be protected against akrasia, of course, would be
through its members being individually so devoted to the collectivity that it
inevitably behaves in the fashion of a virtuous agent. But short of such a radical
alternative to akrasia, there are a number of means whereby a group might try to
ensure that it achieves continence: that is, a form of self-control that does not
require virtuous devotion (Pettit and Smith 1993).
The strategies I have in mind often serve two purposes: first, to show the
group a salient way out of a discursive dilemma, by identifying a course of
action whereby coherence can be achieved and, second, to guard against the
unwillingness of some members to go along with that course of action. The first
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purpose is associated with self-direction, the second with self-control. Here we
are only concerned with the strategies as means of achieving the second, self-
controlling effect (see List and Pettit 2000).
The first and most obvious strategy for promoting self-control in a
collectivity would be for the group to ensure that the costs of failing to achieve
such self-control are significant.  The members might precommit themselves to
being collectively rational, for example, exposing themselves to a cost that all will
have to bear in the event of failing to achieve such rationality. Or the members
might lay down procedures under which those who remain recalcitrant in the
attempt to achieve collective rationality will be expelled or punished in some
way.
A second sort of strategy for achieving collective continence would have
the group seek, not to raise the costs of failing to achieve self-control, but to
restrict the opportunities for such failure. Thus the group might restrict the range
of matters in respect of which it acts, recognising that troubles loom outside the
boundary thereby imposed. This strategy may only be of limited use, of course,
since the group may not be able to impose an effective boundary without
compromising its ability to advance its purposes. Or, alternatively, the group
might take steps to try and ensure that differences of the sort that give rise to
discursive dilemmas do not emerge. The group might seek, by whatever means,
to bring members of the group together in their views as to what the group
should judge and on how it should act. The means adopted could involve an
increase in deliberative discussion — though that could backfire by sharpening
rather than moderating differences (Sunstein 2000) — or a resort to less savoury
ways of shaping and homogenising people’s opinions.
A third sort of strategy whereby a group might achieve self-control — and
indeed self-direction — is probably more promising. The members of the group
might follow a procedure  whereby the decision on problematic issues is taken
out of their individual hands. They might arrange to have such matters decided
by more or less automatic procedures. This sort of self-denying ordinance comes
in two particularly salient versions.
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Under the first version of the strategy  the group would agree in advance
that should different majorities support incoherent positions on related issues,
then the positions adopted on certain sorts of issues should dictate,
independently of majority vote, the position that the group should adopt on
other issues. Thus the group might decide that in the event of majorities having
endorsed in the past positions that dictate a position on an issue that arises later,
the earlier votes should rationally dictate the group position on that later issue.
Or a group might decide that the positions adopted on more general, principled
issues should rationally dictate the position to be adopted on matters of greater
detail. Or whatever.
Under the second version of this strategy, the group would agree that, in
the event of recalcitrance causing a problem — or indeed more generally — the
group position should be determined by some designated officer, or perhaps by
a small committee that is not so likely to be affected by discursive dilemmas. This
strategy would enable the group to transcend the difficulty raised by such
dilemmas in a smooth and unproblematic manner, though it would compromise
the participatory character of the collective. As the first version privileges certain
considerations in the formation of group views, this second version would
privilege certain members.
These remarks should be sufficient to indicate that not only are integrated
collectivities likely to be plagued by a malaise resembling akrasia.  The malaise in
question looks to be well deserving of the title of ‘akrasia’, so far as those groups
are also likely to have access to strategies of self-control: strategies whereby the
group can keep itself collectively rational, even though its members may not be
whole-heartedly devoted to it.
3. The lessons
The fact that akrasia in collectives takes the form described in the last
section tells us something about akrasia as such and in this final section I
mention some lessons that we can draw from the discussion. I concentrate on
three lessons in particular: first, that akrasia is not mechanical in character;
second,  that it is not essentially a hierarchical phenomenon in which lower-level
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elements revolt against a higher; and third, that it is not exclusively action-
centred in its manifestations: it can affect intentional states as well.  In defending
these lessons, I give support to something close to what Christine Korsgaard
(1999) describes as a constitutional model of the role that reason plays in the
person, though I do not defend the distinctively Kantian views with which she is
associated.
Akrasia is not mechanical in character
The first lesson, according to which akrasia is not mechanical in character,
derives from the discussion in the first section, where we saw that akrasia has no
place in the mere collection, the mere aggregation or the ordered aggregation of
individuals. The ordered aggregation of individuals represents a collective agent
that operates in a more or less mechanical way, paralleling the mode of operation
most of us ascribe to non-human animals like dogs and cats. It relies on voting
and other mechanisms that generate candidate states for the role of judgments
and intentions. And the psychology and organisation of its members ensures,
without anyone necessarily being aware of the fact, that those states will actually
implement that role, at least under intuitively favourable circumstances and
within intuitively feasible limits. They ensure that the ordered aggregation will
achieve and maintain rational unity in the way it forms and unforms such states
and in the way the states lead to action.
We argued earlier that the ordered aggregation cannot be indicted with
akrasia because any failure to achieve rational unity would put its status as an
agent in question, so that there would be no room for thinking that it is an agent
but one that is akratic. We supported that observation by pointing out that
something very similar is going to be true of the non-human animal. Let such an
animal behave in a way that makes no sense in the light of the intentional states
ascribed to it, and let conditions be intuitively normal. We will conclude in such
a case either that it is not an agent proper or that our initial ascription of
intentional states was mistaken. We will not have any good reason for regarding
it as an akratic agent.
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The lesson drawn in our discussion of collectives was that if a group agent
is to be capable of akrasia then it must be an agent that can be aware as such of
the constraints of rationality and that it must be able to regulate itself in the light
of those constraints. Only an agent of that kind could fail to achieve rational
unity in action, even in intuitively normal conditions, and yet count as an
intentional agent proper. Only an agent of that kind would be able to establish its
status as a rationally unified subject through recognising and admitting the
failure, representing the action in question as something that it does not endorse
or own and as something, therefore, in which it was not really present as an
agent.
The point made here would seem to apply more generally, as indeed we
saw in the case of non-human animals. What it establishes is that akrasia
presupposes a sort of agent that is not just brutely disposed to achieve a certain
rational unity in action but that has the capacity to work intentionally at the
achievement of such unity. The agent must be able to recognise the constraints
that have to be satisfied by any system that holds by certain profiles of belief and
desire and the like. And it must be able to identify the requirements of those
constraints in its own case and, in principle, to regulate its performance so as to
meet those requirements (Pettit 1993; McGeer and Pettit 2001).
This lesson, to put it a bit more sharply, is that the agent that is capable of
akrasia has got to be something more than just a decision-theoretic system in
which states of belief and desire mutate and materialise in action according to
standards requirements of rationality (pace Jackson 1984; see Pettit and Smith
1993). It has got to be able to express such states in assertions about what is the
case and about what would ideally be the case, so I surmise, recognising in virtue
of that ability that this or that action is required of it: and recognising this,
despite the occasional failure — even in intuitively normal conditions — to act in
the required way. No failure in a decision-theoretic system would give us reason
to ascribe akrasia if the subject in question did not have this sort of ability; it
would only give us reason to posit a malfunction or to think again about our
initial ascription of intentional states.
Akrasia is not necessarily a hierarchical phenomenon
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The second lesson that I derive from our discussion is that akrasia is not
an essentially hierarchical phenomenon. Traditional discussions of akrasia
suggest that it has a deeply hierarchical aspect, representing the failure of a
higher self to subdue a lower self, or the failure of the superior faculty of reason
to suppress the base passions. ‘Every rational creature, ‘tis said, is oblig’d to
regulate his actions by reason; and if any other motive or principle challenge the
direction of his conduct, he ought to oppose it, ‘till it be entirely subdu’d, or at
least brought to a conformity with that superior principle’ (Hume 1978, 413).
The striking thing about the akrasia that we identified in collectives,
however, is that it does not have a hierarchical aspect at all. The elements that are
in conflict when akrasia strikes are coordinate factors, not factors that are
arranged in any order of power or authority. They are simply the different
individuals involved, as in the example of the editorial committee that we
discussed. Each of these has his or her own view as to what the group should
judge and do and each is generally disposed to play his or her part in the
integration of the group as an agent proper. But even when the demands of
integration are discerned among the members, and even when conditions of
functioning are normal, each is subject to the possibility of a certain recalcitrance
of motivation. When that recalcitrance surfaces on a wide front, the individuals
fail to get their act together and the group fails to act as its commitments require.
And that failure is precisely what constitutes akrasia.
If we agree that there is collective akrasia of this kind, then we must agree
that akrasia is not necessarily hierarchical in character. But does the collective
case suggest, more strongly, that akrasia in the individual may also take a non-
hierarchical form? I think that it does, though I shall only sketch the possibility
here, not provide a proper defence.
The individual who escapes akrasia, like the collective that does so, will
prove thereby to be a creature of reason. But that this is so does not mean that
reason is itself a faculty that has to impress its rule on more rebellious elements
in the personality. It may be, as in the analogy that the collective case suggests,
that reason is a pattern to be achieved among the elements that go to make the
agent, not itself one of the elements involved. Discourse with others or with
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themselves will make clear to agents that this or that action is required of them if
they are to count as coherent and conversable. But consistently with an agent as a
whole recognising this — in parallel to how the group as a whole might
recognise what it is required to do — there may be different voices within his or
her make-up that continue to register dissent and continue to prove recalcitrant.
We may often think of akrasia materialising as a result of precisely that sort of
recalcitrance triumphing.
What might be the voices that go to constitute an individual agent, in the
way in which different individuals constitute a group? One possibility would be
to conceive of the voices required as the different modalities of cognition and
motivation — the different perspectives — between which individuals often
describe themselves as being undecided. There are longer-term and shorter-term
perspectives, for example; altruistic and egocentric, or social and personal
perspectives; perspectives that are relatively warm or involved and perspectives
that are relatively cool or detached; and so on.  We might think of these
perspectives all being engaged in decision-making, with the engagement being
regulated by the agent’s sense of what reason overall requires. And we might
think of akrasia appearing so far as some of the perspectives prove resistant to
the adjustments that overall reason dictates and prove capable of affecting action.
There is no problem in seeing how the different voices in a person might
give counsel that offends against reason, where we conceive of reason as a
certain unified sort of pattern. As there are discursive dilemmas that arise for any
group, so there will be dilemmas that arise among these voices, even if the voices
are each them consistent in their own recommendations.
Imagine that a person confronts the issue of whether or not to buy a
Volvo, where it is assumed that the decision turns on two questions: one,
whether it would be good to have a car; and two, whether a Volvo is the best sort
of car to have. And suppose that the relevant voices in a person are: A, the
economic voice of self-interest; B, the ecological voice of the environment; and C,
the voice concerned with what will impress the neighbours. It is entirely possible
that these voices may give support on the following pattern, where support can
be thought of as a sort of voting.
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Good to have a car? Is Volvo the best car? Buy a Volvo?
A. Yes         No No
B. No         Yes No
C. Yes         Yes Yes
Matrix III
The pattern of support represented in the matrix is entirely intuitive. The
economic self A recommends getting a car, because of the saving of time
involved, but recommends against the relatively expensive Volvo. The ecological
self B votes against a car, for standard environmental reasons, but registers that a
Volvo is the best sort of car, given its low emission levels. And the status-
oriented self C recommends both in favour of getting a car and in favour of
getting the praticularly impressive Volvo. But the result is that while there is a
majority of voices that think it would be good to get a car, and a majority that
think a Volvo is the best car, there is also a majority against getting a Volvo. We
might imagine the person who operates under the influence of such voices
coming to the view that he or she should buy a Volvo but proving akratic when
it comes to phoning the dealer.
The picture of individual akrasia that this suggests is attractively
egalitarian and emphasises, intuitively, that the recalcitrant elements in the
akratic agent need not be voices of temptation but voices that make a serious
claim on the person. It would enable us to avoid the downgrading of inclination
and emotion that typifies more standard approaches, and allow us to enfranchise
the affective as well as the intellectual voices within us. The most admirable
human beings, according to the picture projected, would be those who let the
voices of the heart as well as the voices of the head each have their say on every
issue. They would be committed to achieving rational unity in themselves but
not at the cost of suppressing any such voices. They would renounce the sort of
ideal sometimes imagined in traditional moral theory: that of being someone in
whom only one voice speaks, and in whom all elements have been drilled into
march to the beat of one drum.
Our discussion of collective akrasia not only makes an egalitarian vision
of akrasia available, it may also help to explain why the hierarchical picture
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remains so prominent.  We saw in discussion of how collectives achieve self-
control that one way of doing so is by giving over control, in the event of any
rational dissension, to certain considerations or to a certain individual or set of
individuals. One way in which individuals may achieve self-control is by giving
over control, in parallel fashion, to privileged sorts of considerations or to a
privileged sort of voice. The most plausible version of this strategy would be to
give control to more general, principled considerations or to give control to the
cool voice that marshalls such considerations in our reasoning. And that is
precisely the sort of strategy supported in traditional religious and moralistic
writings.
So far as this strategy of self-control has been the most salient one around,
it may have given life to the hierarchical conception of akrasia. For the strategy
suggests that the essential problem in akrasia is the fact that more particularistic
considerations push us away from the rule of the principled considerations that
govern by right, or that the warmer voices of feeling and emotion rebel against
the cool, detached voice that is properly placed in authority above them.
Akrasia is not exclusively action-centred in manifestation
According to the account given of collective akrasia, the malaise involved
has a distinctively practical aspect (Pettit and Smith 1993). The agent fails to
achieve rational unity despite operating within feasible limits and under
favourable conditions. Specifically, the agent fails to achieve rational unity as a
result of a divergence among its members on the question of what it ought to do
and a failure on their part to come into line with the demands of reason on the
group overall. But though the sort of failure involved has this practical aspect, it
is a striking feature of the malaise described that it can affect, not just what the
agent does or forms the intention of doing, but also what it judges to be the case
and thereby comes to believe. Collective akrasia is not exclusively action-centred.
The reason this is so is that the difficulty that gives rise to akrasia — the
difficulty made vivid in the discursive dilemma — can affect the formation of
judgment as well as the formation and enactment of intention. In our original
example of a discursive dilemma, the three members of a group give majority
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support to ‘p’ and to ‘if p, then q’ but not to ‘q’; under the rules described indeed,
they effectively deny that q. Just as the failure of the group to intend or to act as
certain commitments require can be explained by the recalcitrance of a relevant
majority, so such recalcitrance may explain the failure of the group to form such
a judgment. And if it does explain that sort of failure, then we have to see the
group’s not making that judgment as a manifestation of akrasia.
Nothing in this line of thought should be surprising. The making of a
judgment that s — the acceptance  of a corresponding formula — involves the
formation of a belief that s, so far as the agent becomes disposed thereby to act as
the judgment rationally requires: to act as if it were the case that s. But the
making of any judgment constitutes an action. The group acts in making a
judgment on the question ‘s or not s?’; it decides to put the matter to a vote. And
the group acts in actually forming the judgment that s; it goes through the
process of voting. Akrasia can affect the group’s performance in regard to those
actions and so that it can affect its performance in regard to the formation or non-
formation of an associated belief. Even if the group is required by its own lights
to believe that s, it is clearly going to be possible for it to fail to form any belief on
the matter or to come to form the belief that not s; and this is clearly going to be
possible, morever, in intuitively normal conditions of functioning.
The lesson is that akrasia is not exclusively action-centred in its
manifestations. And that lesson, it transpires, may apply in the individual as well
as in the collective case. Assume, uncontroversially, that one of the ways in
which individuals form beliefs is by making judgments: by endorsing relevant
formulae, taking them to be well-supported, and by becoming disposed as a
result of that endorsement to act as if they were true. If an individual can be
conceptualised as a forum where different voices speak, and where the
achievement of agency and personhood requires their continuing orchestration,
then akrasia may strike here in the same way as with the collectivity. Despite
agreed evidence as to what reason requires the individual to judge on some
issue, the voices within the person may fail, akratically, to get their act together.
There may be reason why the individual is required to make a judgment
on some matter like ‘s or not s?’, and yet he or she might fail to address or
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resolve it. Or there might be reason for someone to judge that s, and yet the
person might fail to support that judgment or might even support the judgment
that not s. All the evidence might suggest that a friend has been disloyal, for
example, and yet the voices of affection and nostalgia might refuse to go along,
leading the agent to report, akratically: ‘I know it’s a compelling conclusion; but I
just can’t believe it’.
While this line on the possibility of belief-related akrasia is controversial,
it is not unprecedented and it is not implausible (Mele 1987; Mele 1995). It is
supported, for example, by the fact that we hold people responsible for the
things they believe in domains where we think they are capable of judgment
(Pettit and Smith 1996; Scanlon 1998).  How could we hold people responsible in
this way unless we thought that their beliefs were subject to personal control and
yet that sometimes they failed, akratically, to exercise that control?
Conclusion
The upshot of our discussion is tantalising. We have seen that groups, but
only groups of a distinctively integrated kind, can manifest akrasia. And that
observation has sponsored three fairly well-pointed lessons for the nature of
akrasia in general. It argues that akrasia is not mechanical in character but
supposes a capacity to recognise the demands of reasons and to regulate in the
light of them. It supports an image of akrasia in which the the problem is not a
failure of the higher elements in a hierarchy to subdue lower elements but a
failure among more or less equally ranked elements — equally ranked voices —
to get their act together. And it suggests that akrasia is not exclusively action-
centred in its manfestations, being a malaise that can affect the formation of
judgment as well as the performance of action. None of these claims will prove
irresistible, of course, but they should each make a serious claim on our
attention.
They should make a claim on our attention, I have suggested, not just in
relation to collectives but also in relation to individuals. The image of the
individual as an amalgam of different voices is only a metaphor, of course, and
there is no suggestion that those voices have the autonomy of different persons
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or contribute to the views of an individual in the procedurally procrustean
manner of voters. But the point it conveys is surely engaging: that there may be
profit in thinking of the individual as a plurality of perspectives that interact in a
continuing search for the unity of a single, reasoned vision. And if we do think of
the individual in that way then akrasia will have to be seen in the individual as
well as the collective case as a phenomenon that is non-mechanical and non-
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1 There are a number of disputes that divide writers in this recent literature and
they come up in particular with the analysis of group intention. One bears on the
effect-of-intention question: whether it is necessary for collective intention that
those who try to enact it are licensed — perhaps licensed on the basis of an
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implicit agreement — in rebuking those who fail to do their part in advancing or
securing the intention. Another relates to the intended-content question: whether
it is necessary that each of us in the group intend not just that I, this individual
behave in a certain way — presumably this is necessary — but also that we, the
group do so. And a third concerns the intending-subject question: whether in
addition we, the group must form an intention to do something — at whatever
locus this is to be formed — such that this may not reflect anything that I or you
intend that we do. I do not intend here to try to adjudicate on any of these
disputes, though the position adopted in the next section does have implications
for how they should be resolved.
2 Why suppose that the individuals consider the issues separately? Why suppose,
for example, that they consider whether the group should endorse ‘q’, in
abstraction from the question as to whether it has already endorsed ‘p’ and  ‘if p,
then q’? The argument could be run without this supposition but two
considerations make it a natural one to make. First, there will be no loss in
having the individuals consider the issues separately, so far as they are capable
of putting any resultant incoherence right. And second, it would seem to be
better policy to let the incoherences emerge, and then to look at how they should
be put right, rather than to have individuals privilege existing group
commitments and avoid incoherences emerging in the first place; it may be the
existing commitments that should rationally be revised and not the commitment
most recently supported by individual voting.
3 This paper was first presented at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public
Ethics, Canberra in March 2001, and I benefitted greatly from the various
comments I received on that occasion.
